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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Statement of the Problem 
The natural sciences represent one of the ~ost 
successful methods of compiling and utilizing knowled~e o~ 
the world that man has ever found. Few people would dispute 
this since most of the ~ajor advances of this century in 
the fields of industry, technolo~, medicine, and many 
others have been made possible by the natural sciences. 
Respect for the sciences as a method of solving problems 
and generally dealing with difficult ~uestions has grown 
tremendously, approaching adulation, in al~ost all the 
civilized countries of the world. This respect is almost 
invariably justified by pointing to the successes already 
achieved by science, as one might expect. But what one 
might also expect concerning an area of hu~an life 
, 
consciously given such importance is intense and widespread 
reflection on it in an atte~pt to deternine the reasons why 
it is so successful, and what, if any, are its li~itations. 
Reflection on the ~ethod of science has in fact been done 
by at least two important groups - the scientists 
themselves and the philosophers of science. It is my 
contention, however, that they have not for the ~ost part 
dealt with the questions of why science has had such ~reat 
l 
success and what its limitations as a 'llethod are. It is 
those two questions that will occupy the 11ajor parts of 
this paper, bu"C. before takinP," the11 up I wan.._: to give more 
careful attention to the scientists and philosophers of 
science in an atte11pt to see what they have done. 
B. Critique of ::>ome Qt.her Approa.ches 
The efforts of the scientists and philosophers of 
science have varied tre11endously depending on the aspect 
of science they chose to study or the approach they adopted 
for their study. No one would say that the practicing 
scientist is not concerned with the method of science, but, 
his concern with it is for the most part very prac+,ica.l 
and internal. His position as an active, :functioning 
scientist requires that he adopt this approach to his 
science most of the time. In any ~iven experiment that a 
scientist conducts he must be concerned with problems of 
research t.echnique such as control groups, statistical 
data verification, and so on. The nature of his endeavor 
is to ~ science, not just to talk about it. But because 
of that very fact he may not know much about his science. 
Talking about something implies getting above it, or at 
least out of it long enough to see it as a whole entity !!l 
relation to other entities. The scientist as a workinp. 
scientist is not involved in that kind of question. The 
techniques and methods he uses are not designed for that 
2 
type of 11111eta-inquiry." The scientist could conceivably 
go through his entire professional career without ever 
asking what the ~er-ninp of his science as a whole is. His 
approach to his science as an independent research scientist 
may not vary greatly from what it was as a bep.inninp. student 
of the science. 
Tho~as Kuhn makes ~uch the sa~e p9int as I have made 
here in his discussion of the priority of paradigms in ~ 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He points out that 
once a scientist accepts a paradiFm as descriptive of his 
area of science it is not necessary for hi~ to deal with or 
atte~pt to justify .the first principles on which that 
paradigm is based. 1 The paradigm of a given science ~ust 
be accepted by the student of that science if he is to be a 
student at all, but it is usually ~P.intained throughout his 
career. As the student proceeds from the 7resh~an level 
through to the doctorate, the scientific proble~s ~iven to 
him become 11ore complex and less precedented, but:: uthey 
continue to be closely modeled on previous achieve~ents as 
are the problems that normally occupy him during his 
subsequent -independent scientific career. 112 -Kuhn is talking 
here about what he calls "nor.nal" science which he says is 
what most scientists do. This involves working within an 
ac'cepted paradigm rather than atte'Dpting to develop a new one 
to ground the science on. Kuhn does not deny that the latter 
happens, but he does claim that it is rare and that most 
science is "nornal" science. rv:ore than that one can say 
that scientists are in virtually all cases trained 1Q ~ 
nornal scientists since their teachers work within a 
paradigm and teach that pa.radig11 as the proper way to 
understand that science. 
The endeavor of the scientist does not see11 to lend 
itself to quel:ltions like "Why has scienc-e been so success-
ful?" or "What are the limitations of science?" This is 
not leveled as a criticism of science, but is merely an 
observation of the way science functions. "Biolon- as a 
science cannot be examined under the 11icroscope," as 
Theodore Kisiel puts it.3 I do not intend to suggest that 
the scientist as a man or philosopher cannot deal with 
these questions, for he surely can, but the scientist .9:Ha 
scientist cannot. 
If this is the case, then, it see11s i11portant that 
philosophy of science deal with questions about science 
such as the reasons for and limitations on its success as a 
method. While there is already a. very strong school o~ 
philosophy of science frequently referred to as "cornrnon" 
philosophy of science,· it does not concern itself su~ficient­
ly with questions of this nature. An exainple o~ a. philosopher 
of science fro~ this school is Israel Scheffler. In his 
book Science and Subjectivity he describes co11rnon philosophy 
of science as that school whose position on the nature o~ 
science has "attained the status of a standard view. 114 
4 
In the first chapter of his book Scheffler ~a~es a 
nu~ber of re~arks which reveal what he thinks science is. 
He describes science RS a "syste'Tlatic public enterprise, 
controlled by logic and by e'Tlpirical ~act, whose purpose 
it is to fornulat.e the truth about the natural world. 115 
The e'11phe:sis in Scheffler's discussion is on the objective 
truth of scientific assertions. He attempts to support 
the belief that science does achieve such truth by appealing 
to 11 independent and controlling standards" on research. 6 
He feels that if the objective truth of science cannot be 
'11aintained, then everything collapses into total arbitrari-
ness. While his argu1lent is open to attack on many fronts, 
my point in !Dentioning it here is not to criticize it as an 
argument but to show what co'11mon philosophy of science, as 
it is conceived by Scheffler, concerns itself with. It is 
an endeavor which :~_aims at examining the structures of 
scientific explanation with regard to their truth and 
objectivity. It does not attempt to show why science is 
so successful, but only wants to prove that it is a true 
account of nature. Neither does it seek to es-tablish the 
limitations on science. 
Other writers in philosophy of science have similarly 
limited the issues that they feel philosophy of science 
should deal with. In his introduction to Readinp:s in the 
Philosonhv o~ Science Baruch Brody mentions three basic 
types of problems that he feels should be considered by 
5 
philosophy of science. :'he first that he brinp.s up is the 
significance that new scientific findinps 'lliP.'ht have f'or 
tradition~l philosophical issues such as t.he principle o+' 
indeter~inacy in quantu'll mechanics. 7 Another type of' 
question would be involved with the analysis of' basic 
scientific concepts such as nu'llber, force, and so on. 8 
:he third that he 1lentions concerns the goals and :nethods 
the scientist should choose, i.e., should the scientist 
explain or just describe, should he"postulate the existence 
+- b d · ··ti 119 'lhe i i-"i .c- +· o .... uno serve en -c 1 es.... ~ s gn :I cance O: ques ..,ions 
like these may be very great and, again, I do not wish to 
argue against them, but only to point ou~ that they do not 
allow us to examine science as an entity or mode of knowing 
in relation to other ~odes of knowing. They do not tell us 
why science is so successful or what its limitations as a 
method are. 
C. Outline of a new Approach 
As I indicated earlier the questions I want to answer 
are, "Why has science been so success:'ul?" and ''What are 
the limitations of science?" The second and- third sections 
of this thesis are intended to answer those ques~ions. The 
second section offers an analysis of 'llodern science as 
research in an atte~pt to deter~ine its essential structures. 
This should make easier discovering ·so~e of the reasons for 
the success of science. :lany of' -+:he argu""lents in this 
6 
section come fro'll an article by ~,,.,artin 
Age of the World View." 
)1• 
!{ 
Reid~gger, 
w 
"The 
The third section is an atte11pt, to trace the possible 
I 
development of the scientific or theoretical knowinp out 
of 'llan's everyday involvement with the world around him. 
This should provide an excellent perspective for comparing 
these two 'llodes of knowinp. and being, the scienti~ic and 
the everyday ~odes. 
. II. MODER:i SCIENCE AS RESEARCH 
A. The Projective tJa ture of Resear.ch 
The position that science holds in modern society is 
one that is greatly respected if not held in awe by most 
people. Science has that position becau~e of the incredible 
improve~ents in living standards, health, working conditions, 
etc., that it has made possible. Science has the reputation, 
with good cause, of being the one discipline that success-
fully and consistently finds solutions to the problems it 
sets itself. But few people, including scientists and 
philosophers of science, seem to understand just why science 
is consistently so successful. Could it have anything to do 
with it's "setting its own proble;ns?" Or is the 'nethod of 
science appropriate for solving just any proble~ that ~ight 
be tossed up to it? 
I intend here to give a rather extensive analysis of 
the nature of modern science followinF the arguments given 
by Heidegger in "The Age of the World View." The reason 
for doing this will be primarily to provide a basis for 
deter'ninin~ the causes of success in the scienti~ic method 
as well as the limitations of that ;nethod. It will be ~y 
coatention that the success and the li~itations of scieRce 
are but two -nanifestations of the sarne characteristic that 
' 
sets science off frorn o':her 'DeT.hods o<' gainJ~I' <nowledire. 
I ~i 
I!' 
Heidegger begins his discussion of ~odern science by 
contrasting it brie:f'ly with Ancient, and J'.~edieval science. 
I 
While both of the latter ages had their scientists and 
observers of nature, it is clear that they did not achieve 
the success of science in our age. The charAc~eristic of 
modern science that most positively differentiates it from 
that of earlier ages, according to Heidegger, is the fact 
that it functions primarily in the mode of research. If we 
are to understand ~odern science and the modern ape that is 
so heavily influenced by it, we must carefully examine this 
scientific research to see what its nature is. 
The basic procedure by which research functions, 
Heidepger says, is to delineate for study a field or sphere 
of nature by projecting beforehand what that area will be. 
The significance of this deciding be~orehand or projectin~ 
exactly what is to be done will become clearer as the 
discussion proceeds. Not only does research procedure 
decide in advance what area is to be studied, but it also 
deter~ines how that area should be approached. 
While practicing research scientists may not overtly 
recognize their work as a process of projecting, they do 
refer to individual research endeavors as "research projects." 
They are fully aware that if their work is to be called 
"scientif ic 11 it must be rigidly control led fro:n the 
beginnine: with respect to ~ it wishes to investigate, and 
9 
how it intends to proceed. Any scientist be consider-
ed unscientific, if not a fool, who described his research 
project as an atte11pt .'!lerely to "find out about" "l'lice, for 
l 
exa'Dple, by "whatever 11ethod 11 occured to him at any given 
ti~e. He would be asked precisely what he wanted to know 
about 11ice (the particular physiological effect o: a given 
quantity o~ a certain drur under stated conditions, perha~s), 
and precisely how he intend.ed. to go about getting this 
infor~ation (method of administering +,he drug, necessary 
equip~ent, coatrol group data, for example). I~ he could 
not give information such as this and in much preater 
detail than I have suggested here, his colleagues would 
simply dismiss what he wanted to do as something other than 
science or at least as inadequate and unacceptable research 
procedure. Wb~t his plan lacked was precisely what makes 
"research" of modern science and differentiates it from 
Ancient and Medieval science. It lacked the definite and 
precise projection of the sphere of nature that was to be 
investigated, as well as a definite and precise formulation 
of how that investigation would proceed. The possibility 
of his gaining scientific knowledge in such -a :nci.nner would 
be mini11al if not non-existent. 
The above example of the way working scientists approach 
their research projects is given to help ground ~any o~ the 
assertions I will 11ake at the functional level of science. 
10 
B. The Mathematical Nature of Research 
Heidegger recognized, as Kant had bef"ore him, that the 
uniqueness· of 11odern science as well as the key to its 
success lay i~ its method. As a 11ethod modern science 
ai~s at gainin~ knowled~e o7 nature, but not just any 
knowledFe. It knows before it begins to examL~e nature 
what it wants to know from it. It is this fact that pro:npt-
ed Heidegger to call the sciences "mathematical" in a sense 
that was not applicable to Greek and Medieval science. 
Both Greek and r;ledieval scientists stud.led nature. '!'hey 
made careful, often precise observations and some even 
e:TJployed ~athematical measurement in their observations. But 
they still were not mathe11atical ~ sciences the way Heidepger 
claims modern science as research is. He clPrified this 
assertion with a discussion of the :TJeaninp of the mathemati-
cal as it arose with the Greeks. ':'he mathematical essential-
ly is "that which man knows prior to his observation of 
things: of bodies - the corporal; of plants - the vegtative; 
" t 10 •••• e c. 
Heidegger further discusses the mathematical in What 
is a Thing. There he points out that while numbers are 
commonly identified with the mathematical, they are only 
one example of it. Numbers are indeed 11athe11atical, but 
only because they represent something we can know about 
things prior to our observation of them.11 If we encounter 
11 
three objects together we know immed_ia tely that there are 
three of the:n. We :nay have no idea what they are, but prior 
to experiencing them this possibility of knowledp.e about 
the11 was open to us. 
The mathematical is that which allows us to experience 
things as things at all, or as these particular things. 
:his is rele¥ant to all types of knowing, but the sciences 
have grasped it as a presupposition of knowinp more 
deliberately than any other field of knowledpe. Science as 
,., 
research does not 1111erely observe'' nature in order ~o l<:now 
it. It recog!lizes that in order to know nature with 
certainty it rnust observe nature .f'rom this or that precise 
point of view, but no other. Mere opservation allows for 
the collection of unlimited amounts of random data, but 
random data is precisely what science does not aim for. 
All research scientists, in their laboratory work, are 
concerned with the variables that may effect their results. 
Those variables must be reduced to an absolute mini11u11 if 
the results are to be reliable. Often the only variable 
left in the experi11ent is the one that the project was 
designed to determine. But merely observing-the world 
would be to see everything that occured as yet another 
variable. In scientific research mere observation si11ply 
h's no pl2ce. 
Heidepger chooses ~odern physics to demonstrate what he 
means by the "mathe1la.tical" nature of natural science. 
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Physics, he says, projects nature as the "self-su:'"'ficien+, 
kinetic relation of points of mass in space and ti11e. 111?. 
This constitutes what HeidegP."er calls a "blueprint o""' 
nature, 1113 and given this blueprint all natural event.a are 
"deter:nined in advance as spatioternporal kinetic magnitudes. 1114 
The projection of natural events in ter~s of magnitude ~akes 
the use of nu:nber and calcµlation appropriate as a :'1'.lode o:'"' 
describing those events. llli!, as indicated above, the use 
of number and calculation is not what gives physics its 
:nathematical nature. ~he fact that physics projects nature 
as the realm of nu:nberable and nalculable events and studies 
it only under that aspect makes it mathe:natical. The pro-
jection of nature could have involved entirely different 
categories that had nothing at all to do with number, and 
it would still have qualified for the title of mathematical 
physics. 
The concept of "exactness" in the mathe'1latical sciences 
follows from their mathematical nature understood in the 
sense above. The advantages in learning that the sciences 
gained by projecting nature under a certain aspect in order 
to achieve certain knowledge within the bounds of that 
projection would have been lost if the procedure of their 
actual research had not. adhered strictly to the projection 
or blueprint with which it began. ·This strict adherence 
to the initial projection of nature is what exactness 
meant in this context for Heidegger. The exact calculations 
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of physics do not of the11selves rnake it an exact science.· 
It is exact because it proceeds precisely as i~ says it 
will in the blueprint or ground plan of nature it lays 
down initially. 
Exact :neasurement and exact calculation are, incident-
ally, exact for the same reason that ~hysics as a science 
is exact. A m easure.11ent is exact if it appeals to a 
de:f'in'ite standard and does not deviate fro'll it; a calculat-
ion is exact if its method is clearly stated and adhered to 
in practice. _ In each case what is to be done ('Tl easurinp 
or calculating) is llnderstood in advance, and if this is 
strictly adhered to the process is exac+,. While the 
Greek or Medieval scientists may have e.'Tlployed exact 
measure11ent in their science, their science as a whole was 
not exact. The measurement itself employed a standard 
and adhered reliably to it, but the science as a whole did 
not. It merely observed. 
It would be an oversifht to discuss modern science as 
research wi~hout makin~ reference to scientific experiment. 
The actual, individual experiment is not something over 
and above research, but is in essence the primary vehicle 
of it. ·A given experi~ent may be designed to either 
confirm or deny some particular aspect of the larger 
projection of nature accepted by :he science as a whole, or 
it may be intended to "flesh-out" that projection in the 
sense that Kuhn uses when he speaks of puzzle solvinp in 
14 
,. 
I•: 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 15 f{ 
1·'.' 
I!' 
In any case the individual experi~ent will invariably 
have the characterist'ics described for research thus far. 
I 
It will.rely on the general projection of nature accep~ed 
by this discipline, and it will adhere very strictly to 
that projection in its procedure. Otherwise it would 
neither be considered exact nor scientific. 
Heidegger points out that while the ancient Greeks 
were very keen in their observation of nature they did"!Jnot 
do experimen~ in the sense of ~odern research. 16 They may 
have used ~easurement or instru~ents to assist in their 
observation, but they did not begin their observation with 
an assumed blueprint of nature that was to be verified or 
denied through their observations. Merely observin~ nature, 
regardless of how careful or accurate those observations 
are, does not constitute science as research. 
c. The Institutional Nature of Research 
Another characteristic of science that follows fro~ 
the procedure of research as it has been described. thus 
far is called "busy-ness 11 by Heidegger.17 A science can 
be said to have aquired the character of busy-ness when 
it becomes necessary to establish institutes to control 
the research that goes on in that science. Once the 
science in question has adopted a particular projection 
of nature as the area of knowledFe appropriate to it, it 
15 
~ust control the research that is done if it is to master 
that area. But the work that is to be done in the future 
will alway_s be dictated by the results of research done 
in the past. 
The point to be emphasized is that the projective 
nature of· science as research ul t,imately becomes the 
architect of the organizational whole of the science 
involved. Institutes, foundations, publications, and 
conferences ~ust all be created in order to facilitate 
the exchanr-e of information on what research has been done, 
and to determine and control the research that must be 
done in the future. 
The fact that institutes, publications, etc., develop 
for any given science is an indication that it is "taking 
possession of its own real nature. 1118 By "its own real 
nature" Heidegger means the projective nature of research.. 
The deliberate use of past results to determine new areas 
for research amounts to adopting the procedure of projection 
as virtually the only guiding force for the science. This 
means that the procedure of research as the projection of 
-
nature under a certain paradif.'rl'l, to use Kuhn's term, has 
reached its lopical conclusion. The purpose o~ the science 
in question is to fully understand all of nature under this 
paradigm. In order to do this it must determL~e and direct 
all future research on the basis of past and present 
research that were also controlled by the paradig:n. In 
16 
order to acco:nplish the tas1< of completely "f'leshinp-out," 
the paradigll SOile overriding structure for directin~ 'the 
science must be adopted, and this usually takes the ~on 
of the con:erences, institutes, and so ~orth,mentioned 
abov.e that facilitate information exchanpe and dictate 
what is to be done in the future. 
At this point, Heidegger asserts, the procedure of 
research has been "granted definite precedence over Beinp ••• , 
which research makes objective.•1 9 Nature, which constitutes 
the real~ of being for the natural sciences, is now under-
stood by those sciences as the totality of objects available 
~or study according to an acceptable projection. The bein~ 
and individuality they once had is lost to the science that 
now trea"ts the11 as "obj ectifiable en ti ties" only •. 
D. The Applicability of Research to Other Areas of Knowledpe 
The determination of the being and truth of nature for 
the natural sciences can only be accomplished ~hru the 
procedure of research which is their 'Tlethod of knowing. In 
order for understanding to be achieved at all, nature 'llust 
be subsu'lJed under the categories provided by the paradigin 
or projection accepted by the science involved. In no 
other way cari the objects of nature even be said to exist. 
"Only what thus beco'Tles an object JJ!, is recognized as 
existent. Science as research occurs only when it is in 
this objectification that the being o~ the existent is 
17 
sought. 1120 With this quotation and 
r, sentencJ.~ i~mediately 
j!I. 
following it Heidegger ~alces two points. First he wants 
to say that existence for science lies in objective 
l 
representation of a thing, and secondly that truth lies in 
the certainty of that representation. 
He further suggests that this conception of beinp and 
truth was first, found iri +.he metaphysics of Descar~es. The 
following will be an atte11pt to show the relationship 
between ~he ~ethod of modern science as projection and 
Descartes' metaphysics. So~e Heideggerian points will be 
used. 
Early in Descar~es' investigation of being and truth 
in the Meditations he determined that the only thing of 
whose existence he could be absolutely certain was hi~self, 
the ego. Once that deternination was accepted he began to 
investigate the possibility of deternininf the existence o"" 
other things in the world. Only those things would be 
accepted as existent whose being he could know with certitude. 
Through this process Descartes had effectively placed ine.n at 
the center of all that is as that entity who could ·bestow 
"the seal of being1121 on other en ti ties. 
The significance of this approach to being and truth is 
that for Descartes the world was not so~ething to which he 
opened himself, but, rather, it was so~ething that he 
determined for himself. If a thing can be represented with 
certitude to man-~he-ultimate-subject it can be said to 
18 
exist. I~ it is not available to such representation its 
existence remains open to doubt. 
For the first ti~e in the history of hu~an though~ man 
was in a position to challenge and interrogate nature. He 
was no lonrer ~erely open to experiencinF it. He had 
become the ultimate subject with who~ nature had to be in 
so~e relation in order to exist ~ all. He would ask of 
nature the questions he wanted answers to instead of accept-
ing the random data offered to him by nature. 
For the first time man began to realize what value the 
"if-then" hypothetical statements could have if .. applied to 
the investigation of nature. He saw that 1f. he viewed 
nature fro~ a particular perspective, then he could reach 
conclusions about nature that would be conditioned only by 
the limitations of the original g. Thus was the "hypoth-
esis" of modern scientific research born. 
fhe men of science began to see that if their 
conclusions were to be in any sense certain, they had to 
exclude any evidence or factors which were not certain or 
reliable. This consideration required that they project in 
advance precisely what types of evidence they would admit, 
and systematically exclude all others in the course of their 
investigation. Through this procedure they were able to 
obtain from nature exactly the answers they wanted and no 
others. 
The reasons for the success of this method should be 
19 
made as clear as possible. There can be 
' I• 
r 
1iF 
no 1aoubt 
w 
that 
the success is limited, b~t it is precisely because it is 
li~ited that it is successful at all. The genius of the 
- ---, 
method lies in the fact that it deliberately chooses a 
perspective and syste~atically investigates na~ure from 
that perspective and no other. Only data appropriate to 
that perspective is collected, and the conclusions reached 
are valid within the li~its of the initial projection or 
perspective (assuming, of course, that the projection is 
rigidly adhered to throuphout the investigation). 
But, since few people of the ~odern age question the 
fact that the scientific method is success:f'ul, we should 
here e~phasize ~he limitation of that success. And the 
limitation of any science lies in the projection of nature 
that it starts with. It is a hypothetical endeavor. Given 
this projection of nature certain thinps follow. But that 
projection may be of limited use for many areas of hu~Fn 
life and entirely inappropri8te f'or others. Science has not 
discovered any absolute truths, and any scientist who claims 
that science has understands neither the limitation nor the 
genius of his science. Within the limits of-its applicabili"':y 
as defined by its projection of nature a science may be valid. 
More than that it cannot claim. 
The above paragraph deals with individual sciences and 
the applicability of their respective projection to various 
hu~an proble~s, but ~ore can be said about the sciences in 
20 
general from the standpoint of their underlyinr. metaphysics. 
The natural sciences, as we have said, conceive of bein~ 
and truth as objectivity of representation and certainty of 
representation, respectively, following the lead of Descartes. 
Such an understanding literally denies "the seal of beinp.'' 
to vast areas of hu"llan li:e and experience which cannot be 
fully objectified and represented with the certainty de:'lland-
ed by science. Music, art, poetry, and many other areas of 
life are excluded fro"ll the realm of science, but "llore than 
that, the understanding of being maintained by science can 
not make provision for them even ~o exist in a limited 
sense. The limited ability of such a metaphysics to deal 
with human experience is apparent, then, and such a :'lleta-
physics can be accurately evaluated only as one a"Tlong :'TJany 
ways of understanding being and truth. ~he realization 
must be f ir~ly and clearly established in order that the 
significance of the further task of defining precisely the 
li~its of science in dealing with human proble~s can be 
recof?lized and more deliberately dealt with. 
My purpose, then, has clearly not been to say that 
science is evil. It is obviously very valuable 7or man 
and to deny this value would be absurd. The purpose has 
~ to say that science as a 11ethod of dealing with hu'Ylan 
problems is li"!Jited, and that the limitations of it "TIUst be 
clearly defined if we are to avoid "llisusinp it. 
Men ~ust see that the understandinp, of bein~ and truth 
21 
' 
ii', i~plied in science is not appropriate for so\vinp all hu~an 
1!1' 
proble:'Ds. Attempting to use science to solve problems 
inappropriate to it can only lead to further difficulties. 
j 
Theodore Kisiel' s article, "Science, Phenomenology, and ~he 
Thinkinf.' of Being," deals at so:'De length with this prob le"!!, 
and since he treats it as an evaluation of the sciences, a 
discussion of his article is appropriate here. 
Kisiel attributes to Heidegger the position that 
modern technology, while not being merely applied science, 
does rnanif est the hidden character of ~odern science. As 
such it calls for careful study. The path +'or its develop-
ment was laid out by modern physics in which the forces o~ 
nature were calculated in advance and then veri~ied through 
experi.nent. r:rechnology was T,O develop as an over+, mani+'est-
ation of the sa11e rnethod of dealing with nature. It gives 
us a procedure by which to deal with nature in order to 
acco:npl ish a predetermined p-oal. '!he goal in this case 
is not the aquisition of knowledge as it is in scien:ific 
research, but the method is the same in terms of projecting 
beforehand what needs to be done and how it can be. done 
most efficiently. 
The actual goals of most technological pro.jects involve 
the control and disposition of "nature" for whatever 
predetermined purpose man desires. Such projects almost 
inevitably become highly complex - irnfl.f ine the d i+'f icul ty 
of findine,, procuring, and ultimately using all the materials 
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needed to build an auto~obile - and all o~ the thinF-s needed 
for the acco~plishment of the given end beco~e mere 
co:nponent~ in the greater system. One o~ the primary 
reasons this becomes a problem is that man hi~self is a 
natural resource that is necessary to the functioninp of 
this syste~. Individual ~en have little or nothing to do 
with the fact that the syste~ is there, but they ~ust be 
drawn into it, trained, and distributed in to the "'Tl an power" 
system which serves it. In short, man himself who is 
involved in the system of "disposinp: the actual into a 
system of calculable and reliable components" has become 
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one of the disposable components of that syste~. 
The understandinF of being accompanyinp modern tech-
no logy reflects the "method'' discussed above. BeinF has 
become the "stockpile of natural resources" subject to the 
demands or needs of modern 1lan. 23 All other ways of under-
standing being are ignored when this happens. The result 
is a tremendous i11poveris~1lent of 11an. 
Kisiel suggests that the only way out of the proble~s 
inherent in our current technolopical epoch lies in careful 
deliberation on the presuppositions which govern it. But 
the mathematical, calculative ~ethod necessary to it works 
against any .such deliberat,ion since it can ad:nit only 
c'ertain types of questions as important and accept only 
certain types of evidence as relevant. Everything else is 
syste:natically excluded in order that the ultimate and 
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apparently unquestioned Foal of total plan~tary do~ination 
can be achieved as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
So taken ~p with its own ~ethod is technology that it tends 
to allow even its own presuppositions to be lost. "Even 
- 24 the :forgetting is forgotten," a.a Kisiel puts it. 
The danger in all of this is not so much from the so-
called "de:nonic" nature of technology, but in the exclusive 
way in which it understands the world, being and truth. 
The possibility of co~ing to a more primordial understandin~ 
of these three things is reduced by the bias OT the 
technological/scientific age, and it is in this that the 
danger lies. 
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III. SCIENCE AS A FOUNDED MODE OF KNOWING 
A. The Dependence of Scientific Knowledge on ~ore Basic 
Modes of ~nowinf 
The purpose of this section of the paper is basically 
twofold. Using a Heideggerian example, 25 I want first to 
demonstrate how it is possible for scientific or theoretical 
knowing to develop fro11 'Tlore basic modes of knowing that 
exist in ~an prior to his develop~ent as a scientist. 
Once that is acco11plished I will try to show what the major 
differences are between the two types of knowing and offer 
an evaluation of scientific knowinP' in terms of its lil'l'li t-
ations in comparison to the more basic knowin~ from which 
it developed. 
Manipulation and use of a tool for the achievement of 
some particular end is the general circumstance I will use 
as rny example. My treat:nent of this point will not be a 
mere paraphrase of Heidegger's argument (see Being ang 
ll!!!.!• pp. 410-414), since much ,of his motivation was to 
give a te'Tlporal characterization of everyday involvement 
with the world. That, specifically, is not my concern 
here. The tool may be a hammer and the_ end ~or which it 
is used may be the production of a shoe, but the importance 
25 
of the example lies in understandinF the 
ship that exists between the user of the 
),. 
ti: 
typ~ of relation-
1f 
tool and the tool 
itsel!. There is more to this relationship than ~erely 
I 
the user and the tool since they ~ore than likely exist in 
a greater equipmental context as well as a p.reater beinp. 
context. By equip~ental context I si~ply ~ean that the 
shoema~er who is involved here ~ay be sitting on a bench 
with an anvil under the shoe which he is working on and 
nails lying to one side ready for use. He is aware, in a 
sense, of all these things even though his action at this 
instant is that of pounding on the shoe. His ~oal is par+, 
of what is referred to by the phrase "greater being context" 
above. He is working within a particular context of beinp 
and beings in the world, but he is working toward the 
production of ~o~ething different fro~ his immediate context, 
yet growinf out of it. This point is used by Heidegger as 
a de~onstration of te~porality but it also shows that the 
shoema~er is intimately involved with the bein~ o~ the 
world around him. He is functioning within it and as a 
part of it. He controls it in.the sense that he changes 
part of i~, but it controls hi~ from the standpoint o~ the 
possibilities of being that it offers to hi~. i.e., it 
offers hi~ the possibility of making a shoe out o7 leather 
but not out of water. 
The fact that the shoemaker is workin,v within <the 
26 
possibilities offered to him by the things o~ the world 
around him indicates a certain attitude on his part toward 
the existence or beinp of that world. The beinp of the 
world is no~ so~ething ~otally or for the ~ost part deter~ined 
by him. He works on i~ and with it, but according to the 
·na~ure that he finds in it. It is possible, however, for 
that attitude to change or shift to a theoretical or 
scienti:ic approach to the world and it is that change which 
will elucidate through further development of the example. 
Suppose that the shoemaker has more than one hammer on his 
work table and that one of them is much heavier than the 
others. He lays the lighter hammer down in order ~o do some-
thing without it, and then reaches for it to continue the 
initial task. But he has accidentally picked up the much 
heavier hammer which he ordinarily would not use for this 
work. I~mediately his consciousness of his work is bro~en. 
He is no longer wor~ing within the context of this original 
equipmental totality because his consciousness has shifted 
from that context and is now do~inated by the heaviness o~ 
the ha-nrn er. 
At this point it is possible that the shoe11aker would 
stop his work and begin to examine the ha~mer from this 
new perspective, to "know" it from the standpoin;t of its 
h~aviness. Surely he knew it before, he used it ~or long 
periods of ti:ne, but he now· is cominp to know it .in a 
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different way. The important thing to notice about. this 
shift in "ways of knowinf'' is that he now considers it to 
have a different kind of beinp. The tool-ch8racter of' the 
ha-n11er has essentially been lost. The aspect under which 
it is studied now could as easily be studied if it were 
any other thing whose weight was noticeable i~ a si~ilar 
~anner. But this is not the only chanpe that has occured. 
~e place, the position of the ha~~er (the heavy object) 
no longer has any real significance. It could be studied 
under this aspect here, over there, or anywhere else. 
The ha:nm er prior to the shift was involved in a part ic1.11-ar 
equip~ental totality being used to achieve a particular 
end. None of that has any m~aninp now. It has been 
objectified and universalized such that it is freed from 
all the characteristics that previousiy were used to 
identify it and give it meaning. 
At this point the ontological stage has been set for 
the definitive shift to the scientific or theoretical 
treat~ent of being. !he hammer is no lon~er a tool, but is 
only a thing which can be studied under the theme of 
heaviness or weight. That weight can be cal~ulated and 
co~pared to other heavy things indiscriminately. In fact, 
a character has been discovered here that can be applied 
~, ~riori to all physical objects. The whole of physical 
na't.ure can be projected f'or study as the realm of' heavy 
bodies or things with measureable weight. The type of' 
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knowledre that is had when this is done is surely diff-
erent fro~ that which the shoe~aker had of his hammer, and 
the kind ~f beinf attributed to things is equally differen+,. 
~hey no longer have the individuc:ility they once had - that 
was all traded for calculable weipht. But man now has 
something he did not have before - an ~ priori ability to 
deal with physical nature. literally anything in the 
realm of physical natur~ can now be approached with some 
prior knowledge of it. If one adds to this projection 
other equally universal and calculable factors such as 
~otion, force, location, and time one has developed some 
factors for a science of nature, a physics. And this is, 
in fact, roughly the way :nathematical physics now projects 
the realm of physical nature. Only those aspects of 
physical nature that are universalizable and measureable 
are considered for study. ~he discipline clearly has an 
established ~ for what it will accept as knowled~e of 
nature (the factors mentioned are some of the things it 
seeks) and subsequently a bias for what really constitutes 
,Beine. 
B. Consequences of the Derivative Nature of Scientific 
iCnowledge 
It is precisely this bias for :what constitutes being 
that exists as a problem. The bias is in science as an 
integral part of its method but our age seems to have 
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1, 
ii· devel9ped a blind respect for science which '.Jn too many 
/!'( 
cases gives too little importance to significant hu11an 
realities because they are "unscientific," i.e., not 
l 
universalizable or capable of beinr- captured in a for'DUla. 
Science is, indeed, an i~portant mode of' lmowinp, bu~ 
it develops :ro~ more basic nodes and exists alongside 
other i~portant modes as well. 
xurther light ~ay be shed on our question about 
scientific <nowing by .examining this type of' knowing from 
the standpoint of the subject-object dichotomy which see~s 
to be implied in it. The very nature of the scientific 
'llethod carries with it the necessity of objectifyinp the 
things of nature that it deals with. The particularities 
of the ha~~er we discussed above which Fave it its individ-
uali ty have no sign if ic~nce f'or the physicist,. It may 
be ~he shoe~a~er's favorite ha11~er, it 11ay have a pood 
"feel" and proper balance, but no such facts are relevant 
to know it scientifically. In order to be handled 
scienti:ically it :nust be objectified and categorized wit.h 
other si~ilar objects under a li11ited number of hec:-dinf"s 
such as weight, length, density, etc. As indicated 
earlier this treatment is valuable and useful under certain 
circu~stances, but it is not exhaustive in its treat11ent of 
' the ha~'ller, and neither is it necessarily the~ way to 
deal with it. Shoes, we would all agree, are valuable 
for man, and if the shoe11aker knows only the weipht, length 
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and density of his hammer (and not how to use it), then he 
cannot make shoes. 
Heidegger's treat:nent of this question in Bein~ and 
~ is very much to the point. He describes the subject-
object dichoto:1ly irnplici t in scienti:"ic knowinf'" as a 
superficia 1-f or11al interpretation of the pheno'il en.on of 
knowinf the world.~ 6 Man is first and foremost a bein~ who 
is in-and-toward-the-world. To say that 11an is "in-and-
toward" the world is to say that he has, a.s a matt er. o+' 
fact, developed with the world and as a part of' it. 27 He 
co11es to know himself initially in relation to t.he world; 
as he gets to know the world he gets to 'know hi11sel.f. 
Man does not get to know the world initially a.s something 
that is opposed to hi11 but al11ost as some:hing that is part 
Qf himself. Early in life, for exa11ple, a small child does 
not distinguish parts of his body fro:n parts of the world. 
~he relationship r,hat exists between the child and the 
world is not, at this stage at least, predominately one of 
oppositioa. 
The subject-object approach to knowing the world which 
is essential to the scientific 1lode remains blind, 
Heidegger says, to what is already tacitly i~plied by the 
pheno'Tl en on of knowinf" it sel:. 28 Knowinp.- is i +,self' a I"] Ode 
~ beillP' for man, and :na.n is first and most pri"l'lordially 
a :Beinf"-in-the-world. Xnowinf" is a 11ode of beinp .!Q'rard 
the world as well, and if 1lan's knowin~ the world is a 
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~ode of his beinp in and toward the world it cannot also 
constitute a relationship of isolation betwee!'l a knower 
and a world-as-object. Knowinr is +.he beine~together 
of the ~uower and the world, not their separation as the 
subject-object dichotomy would have it. 
If it is the case that scientific knowina necessarily 
involves·the subject.-object dichotomy as it has been 
discussed here, then it is a li~ited mode of knowing the 
world. We cannot deny that in many cases it is useful, 
but if it is in any sense seen as the only way of knowing 
the world, then it becomes a perversion of man's relation-
ship to his world 'since it ;requires man to be radically 
separated from his wor1d. Such a position would also 
necessarily exclude a very wide range of hu~an problems 
and concerns that do not lend themselves to scientific 
objectification or formalization. 
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IV.; CONCLUSION: THE SUCCESS AND LI!;l!i:ATIONS 
OE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this paper h~s been to exa~ine science 
from a perspective that has gone largely ignored by most 
scientists as well as philosophers of science. The 
per~pective itself di~fers from other perspectives in that 
it concerns i~self with understanding the reasons behind 
the tre:nendous success of science and with see1<:ing out the 
possible limi ~at ions o'f' science as a :1l ethod. Most other 
perspectives, as I mentioned earlier, leave these questions 
unasked and prefer to deal with questions about the internal 
nature of science. 
The significance of my examination of science grows 
out of the incredible significance of science irt tenns of 
the influence it had had onlrnan. Science embodies a method 
of coming to know about the world and a method of dealing 
with it that has succeeded in solving the problems it set 
for itself with probably great~regularity than any other 
method ~an has known. Through that method science has 
achieved amazing progress and it shows no sipns a~ this 
p9int of slowing down. 
'!he problems of defininF 1recisely the 
success in science as well as deternining 
'' 
;,. 
)'!. 
1 · 
on it as a method are intriguing ones and dJ~erve more 
I . ~· 
r 
e'nphasie than they have had. Whatever the reasons for its 
neglect now, it was discussed in the Cri+,ique of Pure 
I 
Reason by Kant. His understanding of the problem was much 
the sane as the one I have traced out here with tne help 
of people like Heidegger and Kuhn. His explanation of 
the genius behind scientific success is both insightful 
and appropriate to concluding remarks on this problem. 
Modern science came into its own, Kant S!iys, when the 
scientists realized that their reason was capable of 
gaining insight only into those things which it produced 
according to its own plan. 29 Reason cannot develop laws 
of nature or anything of that kind by accepting "Accidental 
observations, Tiade in obedience to no thought-out plan, •••• .,30 
!rhe student of nature 11ust approach nature "not in the 
character of a pupil who listens to everythin~ that the 
teacher chooses to say, but as an appointed judf'e who 
compels the witnesses f~o answer ~uest ions which he has him-
self' for:nulat ed. 1131 Heidegger would cal 1 this activity 
of the scientist who forces nature to answer his own 
questions rather accepting 11erely random data the process 
o: projection. Xuhn would say that the scientist in this 
case was wor~inr within a previously acce~ted paradign. 
But all three of them are talking abont the sa:ne thing. 
Science beca11e successful because it stopped "just· lookin~" 
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at nature and began to interrogate nature from a particular 
standpoint in an atte~pt to get just !hi! infor~ation from 
this perspective and nothing else. ~herein ·1ay the genius 
of science and the explanation o! its steady progress. It 
is '!'or this reason that .Kant could use the phrase "the 
secure path of a science. 1132 ~cience was on a secure path 
bec<-0.use it no longer depended on rando11 p-roping. 33 
. 
This insight also provides us with a key for deternin-
ing the li~itations on science as a method. It was success-
ful and secure because it adopted a well-defined perspective 
and sought answers to only certain questions that it had 
chosen. But any question that lay outside the scope of that 
perspective clearly could not be answered by that science. 
This point was mr=de earlier in the discussion of physics. 
Physics is the science that studies those things co~in? 
under the heading of "spatio-temporal kine~ic 111agnitudes."34 
If a thing does not :it under that headinf, physics is not 
interested in it. This is the li~itation of physics and of 
the natural sciences toge;her, but it is also their genius. 
The sciences have not been able to achieve objective 
truth as people li~e Scheffler claim since their knowledre 
is applicable only wi-:.hin the ranf'e of their inii:ial 
perspective or projection of nature. But, within that 
ranre the knowledge they achieve ~ reliable. 
The only point remaining to be e11phasized concerns +,he 
appropriateness of scientific projections for dealinF with 
35 
I 
hu:nan problems. lf so:ne aspect of hu'llan li;~ finds itself 
i!I. 
excluded fro.-n the projection of a given science or the 
collective projections of all the sciences, then that area 
I 
must be dealt with by so~e means other than science. 
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